Denver Law Review
Volume 63
Issue 3 Natural Resources Law Symposium

Article 5

January 1986

Trusting the Public Interest to Judges: A Comment on the Public
Trust Writings of Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning and Johnson
James L. Huffman

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
James L. Huffman, Trusting the Public Interest to Judges: A Comment on the Public Trust Writings of
Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning and Johnson, 63 Denv. U. L. Rev. 565 (1986).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

TRUSTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST TO JUDGES:

A

COMMENT ON THE PUBLIC TRUST WRITINGS OF
PROFESSORS SAX, WILKINSON, DUNNING
AND JOHNSON
JAMES

L.

HUFFMAN*

INTRODUCTION

After several decades of chugging along far more slowly than the
Illinois Central Railroad,i the public trust doctrine has taken flight during the last decade. Courts from Massachusetts to California have increasingly relied upon the public trust doctrine to justify an assortment
of decisions that have the purpose of protecting natural resources from
degradation or destruction. Proponents of the public trust doctrine
urge that it is time to realize that the continent has been conquered and
that something must be done to save it from those who would unknowingly or selfishly destroy it. 2 Because legislators and administrators
have been parties to rampant environmental destruction, proponents argue that we must look to the courts for our salvation and offer the public
trust doctrine as an ideal remedy for the courts to prescribe. Unfortunately, the doctrine is a bit limited in its historic application, 3 but that
* Professor of Law and Director of the Natural Resources Law Institute, Lewis and
Clark Law School. B.S., Montana State University; M.A., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; J.D., University of Chicago. I am grateful to James Zehren for research assistance and to Professor Michael C. Blumm for his helpful comments. I am sure Professor
Blumm would want me to make it clear that the ideas expressed are strictly my own.
1. The leading case in public trust law is Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387 (1892). This case has been read to justify a wide range ofjudicially imposed limits on
the powers of legislatures to transfer resource allocation decisions to private parties. As
with any evolving legal doctrine, the substance of modem public trust law is far broader
than the substance of the decision which forms its foundation.
Although the Illinois Cent. R.R. case has been interpreted as invalidating the Illinois
Legislature's transfer of title to submerged lands to the Illinois Central Railroad, this interpretation is in error. The decision actually holds that the railroad may not object when
the legislature revokes such a grant. In other words, the public trust does not preclude the
legislature from authorizing a railroad to manage submerged lands. It does preclude an
irrevocable grant of such authority in the form of fee simple title: "The legislation which
may be needed one day for the harbor may be different from the legislation that may be
required at another day." Id. at 460. To read the case any other way is to deny the legislature power to decide how the submerged lands will best serve the public interest, and to
transfer that power to the courts. The 1869 grant to the railroad was valid, but "[a]ny
grant of [this] kind is necessarily revocable, and the exercise of the trust by which the
property was held . .. can be resumed at any time." Id. at 455.
2. "Americans have demonstrated almost no success with self-limitation, particularly
in non-renewable resource consumption ....
With a seemingly inexhaustible American
land frontier, this waste posed no apparent difficulty. One could simply move on - over
the next hill or across the river."

R. APPLEGATE, PUBLIC TRUSTS: A NEW APPROACH To

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 12 (1976).
3. See Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Perogative Becomes the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 195 (1980). "For reasons largely historical, this public
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should be no problem for the creative judge. A good hard look will
4
surely reveal that something needs to be done.
The rebirth and dramatic growth of the public trust doctrine is in
no small part the product of a classic article on the subject by Joseph
Sax. Those who are troubled by the new public trust doctrine must
therefore pay close attention to Sax's writing. Other legal scholars have
come to Sax's aid in shouldering the burden ofjustifying and explaining
the public trust doctrine. Their writings therefore also deserve attention. In this article, I will comment on the writings of Professors Joseph
7
6
Sax, Charles Wilkinson, 5 Ralph Johnson, and Harrison Dunning.
The doctrine has been used by courts to invalidate a legislative
grant of submerged lakeshore lands to the Illinois Central Railroad, 8 to
invalidate an agreement between Massachusett's Greylock Tramway Authority and a private ski area developer, 9 to invalidate the issuance of a
permit by the Wisconsin Public Service Commission for the construction
of a dam on the Namekagon River,' 0 and to allow the California Water
Resources Board to reconsider water rights permits granted to the City
trust has commonly been associated with the sovereign's ownership of the beds of navigable waters, and its purposes have been traditionally delineated as those of 'commerce,
navigation and fisheries.' " Id. at 195-96.
4. Professor William Rodgers has suggested that the federal courts "hard look" doctrine is similar to the public trust doctrine. See discussion infra at note 57.
5. Joseph L. Sax is a Professor of Law at the University of Michigan. Sax has discussed the public trust doctrine in several writings, including: SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR CITIZEN ACTION (1971); SAX, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND MANAGEMENT 9 (H. Dunning ed. 1981); Sax, Helpless Giants:
The National Parks and the Regulation of Private Lands, 75 MICH. L. REV. 239 (1976); Sax,
Liberating the Public Trust Doctrinefrom itsHistorical Shackles, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 185 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Sax, Liberatingthe Public Trust Doctrine];Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline
of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REV. 481 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Sax, Decline of Private
Property]; Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Sax, The
Public Trust Doctrine In Natural Resources Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REV.
471 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sax,Judicial Intervention]; Sax & Conner, lichigans Environmental Protection Act of 1970."A Progress Report, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1003 (1972); Sax & DiMento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years' Experience Under the Michigan Environmental
Protection Act, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1974);
6. Charles F. Wilkinson is a Professor of Law at the University of Oregon School of
Law. Wilkinson has authored numerous works, including: Wilkinson, The Field of Public
Land Law: Some Connecting Threads and Future Directions, I PUB. LAND L. REV. 1 (1980); Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 269 (1980).
7. Ralph W.Johnson is a Professor of Law at the University of Washington School of
Law. His works include: R. HILDRETH & R. JOHNSON, OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW (1983);
JOHNSON, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND MANAGEMENT 118

(H. Dunning ed. 1981); Johnson, Public Trust Protectionfor Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14
U.C.D. L. REV. 233 (1980);Johnson & Cooney, Harbor Lines and the Public Trust Doctrine in
Washington Navigable Waters, 54 WASH. L. REV. 275 (1979).
8. Harrison C. Dunning is a Professor of Law at the University of California, Davis,
School of Law. His writings include: Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western IVater
Law: Discord or Harmony? 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17-1 (1985); Dunning, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law and Management: A Symposium, Forward, 14 U.C.D. L.
REV. 181 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Dunning, Forward]; Dunning, The Significance of California's Public Trust Easementfor California's Water Rights Law, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 357 (1980).
9. Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 387.
10. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 35 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
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of Los Angeles in 1940.11 The doctrine's central idea is that the state is
limited in its disposition and management of particular resources; that
the state holds those resources in trust for the public and must dispose
of or manage those resources consistent with that trust.
Historically, the doctrine has been associated with submerged
lands,' 2 but some commentators, 13 including Sax, 14 and some courts
have sought to liberate the doctrine from this constraint. 15 This may
sound straightforward enough, but the discussion of particular cases can
be deceiving. As Professor William Rodgers has noted, "the public trust
doctrine is resoundingly vague, obscure in origin and uncertain of purpose .

. . .

16 He also notes that "[t]here are few experts on the subject

of the public trust and not many more who claim to be experts.' 17 No
doubt the public trust doctrine has determinable historic and modern
content, but like much of the law, the doctrine is what we make of it. It
is a tool to be used in pursuit of our objectives, 18 to be refined, redesigned, or discarded as our needs require.
The fact that we may find the public trust doctrine while rummaging
about in our bag of legal tricks is convenient but not really very important because if the public trust doctrine does not fill our needs something else will. 19 The Oregon Supreme Court found the doctrine of
custom in its warehouse of legal tools, 20 rusty and in need of oil, but still
workable. Modern proponents of the public trust doctrine are influential not because of their expertise on the intricacies of the doctrine, but
because of their expertise at bringing about judicial action in a legal sys11. Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, aff'd, 261 Wis. 492,
55 N.W.2d 40 (1952).
12. Nat. Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709,
189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
13. Stevens, supra note 3.
14. See, e.g., APPLEGATE, supra note 2; Hannig, The Public Trust Doctrine Expansion and
Integration:A Proposed Balancing Test, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 211 (1983); Wilson, Private
Property and the Public Trust: A Theory for Preserving the Coastal Zone, 4 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y. 57 (1984); Comment, The Emergence of the Public Trust Doctrine as a Public Right to
Environmental Preservation in South Dakota, 29 S.D.L. REV. 496 (1984). Other authors have
argued that the public trust doctrine should be limited to its historical applications. See,
e.g., Jawetz, The Public Trust Totem in Public Land Law: Ineffective - and Undesirable-Judicial
Intervention, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 455 (1982); Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water
Rights Context: The Wrong Environmental Remedy, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 63 (1982).

15. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust, supra note 5.
16. See, e.g., State v. Sup. Ct. of Placer Cty., 29 Cal. 3d 240, 625 P.2d 256, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 713, cert denied. 454 U.S. 865 (1981); City of Madison v. State. 1 Wis. 2d 252, 83
N.W.2d 674 (1957).
17. W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.16 (Supp. 1984).
18. Id.
19. This instrumentalist view of the law is rooted in the work of Willard Hurst. See,
e.g., W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY
UNrrED STATES (1967).

20. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969); see Delo, The
English Doctrine of Custom in Oregon Property Law: State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 4 ENVTL. L.
383 (1974). Delo reports that only New Hampshire had resorted to the English doctrine
of custom, and, at that, no more recently than 1851 in Knowles v. Dow, 22 N.H. 387
(1851). ld. at 387. Delo argues that "[t]he Oregon Supreme Court's unexpected revival
and modification of the English doctrine of custom presents significant logical and constitutional problems." Id. at 384.

568
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tern that requires us to justify where we are going in terms of where we
have been. It will not do to tell a court that it should authorize the review of 1940 water rights permits simply because circumstances have
changed and the public interest requires review. What the court really
needs is a legal doctrine that purports to authorize the requested judicial action. The public trust doctrine is interpreted by many as just such
2
a doctrine. I
The foregoing comments reflect a perception of the law that does
not conform to my perception of the dominant approach of American
legal scholarship. Although American law teachers and legal scholars
are all legal realists, 2 2 we are also the flag bearers for Langdellian legal
science. 23 For the most part, we teach and write about law in the same
manner as Langdell did. 2 4 We sort through the evidence, the legal data,
25
in our libraries and seek to explain what the courts have been doing.
The literature on public trust is no different. A 1980 conference at
the University of California at Davis Law School was asked by Professor
Harrison Dunning to consider several questions including: "[I]s there a
single 'public trust doctrine' in natural resources law?"; "[I]s the public
trust doctrine applicable to any natural resource, or is it limited to certain ones?"; and "[Wihat is the nature of the public trust?" 26 These
questions are much like those which might be posed to a conference of
scientists: Is there a single species of a particular type of animal, or, what
is the nature of matter? Scientists do not ask whether there should be a
21. The doctrine of stare decisis, which requires this constant backward glance, is an
effective, but not foolproof, way of assuring that the courts are kept within appropriate
boundaries. Although ostensibly a doctrine that requires the courts to limit themselves, it
is dependent upon constant extra-judicial scrutiny. The adversary process encourages
clever lawyers to propose creative interpretations and applications of current or antiquated doctrines. The role of the critical commentator is central to assuring that stare
dec/sis
operates as a limit on the abuse ofjudicial power, instead of as a license for judicial
government. Driven by the appeal of power, our courts will expect no more of themselves
than we expect of them.
22. Legal scholars are all legal realists in the sense that we all recognize that the law is
employed as a tool for a multitude of purposes. We know that the law is not a force
independent from human values and human choice; we have exercised choice in charting
our legal history and, as Grant Gilmore vividly reminds us, will choose to sink or swim in
the future. Gilmore, The Age of Antiquarius: On Legal History in a Time of Troubles, 39 U. CHI.
L. REV. 475, 488 (1972).

23. Dean Langdell sought to explain the law in terms of a few general principles that
could be indirectly derived from the data of case law and from which judges and lawyers
would deductively determine the results in future cases. For an excellent analysis of
Langdellian Legal Theory, see Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1983).
24. Langdell believed that law students should be taught from appellate cases and
asked to extract the common principles from those cases for the purpose of determining
what the law is. Id. One does not have to sit through very many law classes or look at very
many casebooks to know that that is precisely what happens in most law classes. Although
legal scholars are certainly doing other things as well, such as investigating the policy
questions which our instrumental realism brings to mind, Dean Langdell would be pleased
to know that the basic structure of what we do is his.
25. For an illustration of how this Langdellian approach pervades the legal enterprise
from law school and legal scholarship through legal argument and judicial decision making, see HUFFMAN, Legal Science is Alive and Well in American Law Schools, in PROCEEDINGS
FROM CONFERENCE ON LEGAL EDUCATION: 2000 (Glasgow University, August, 1985).

26. Dunning, Foreword, supra note 8, at 181.
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single species or whether matter should have a particular nature. Nor
do lawyers ask what the public trust doctrine should be. We prefer instead to cover our tracks with stare decisis, at most suggesting new direc27
tions by discussing trends, as if the law has a life of its own.
This brief detour into legal theory should serve to explain my approach in critiquing Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning, and Johnson. I
will not engage in a debate about the historical roots of the doctrine,
although I suspect that in-depth research on the Roman doctrine of res
communes, 2 8 which writers on public trust like to cite as the ultimate authority, 29 may reveal something quite different from the current conception of public trust. Nor will I review the American case law, which dates
from the early nineteenth century. 30 My purpose is to look behind the
legal analysis to see if I can uncover each writer's policy agenda, and to
assess how well they justify the consequences of the legal interpretations
they propose. Although legal scholars generally talk and write as if the
law has some independent source of life, few of us are fooled. We all
know that the public trust doctrine is intended by its proponents to have
particular consequences. Therefore, the merits of those consequences
should be debated and the doctrine should be assessed to determine the
likelihood that it will actually promote its intended purposes.
I.

THE PUBLIC TRUST JURISPRUDENCE OF PROFESSOR SAX

In his 1970 article, Professor Sax wrote that the issue is whether the
states are limited only by the ordinary constraints upon the police
power, constraints that have as their purpose the protection of individual rights or by more restrictive limits on the legislative will. 3 1 The legislative will could be further limited in the interest of individual
freedom, but we would not require a new doctrine for that purpose. We
need only restate or reinterpret the so-called ordinary constraints upon
the police power. 3 2 The more restrictive limits that Sax had in mind
27. For example, the New York Court of Appeals supported its decision to abandon
charitable immunity for hospitals by noting that "the trend of decision throughout the
country has more and more been away from nonliability." Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656,
659, 143 N.E.2d 3, 7 (1957). Sax notes a judicial trend in the treatment of property rights.
Sax. Decline of Private Property, supra note 5.
28. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Roman doctrine as applying to running waters, the air and the sea - "things Common to all and property of
none." United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 724, 744 (1950). The doctrine
of r-ecommunes was defined in the Institutes ofJustinian in these terms: "Res communes:

open to everyone: the air, running water, the sea.., and the seashore to the highest winter
floods." It was distinguished from private property and res publicae, which were the
"'[p]roperty of the state" and "were highways, rivers, and harbours .... that all might
navigate and fish ... the use of banks being public for this purpose." THE INSTITUTrEs OF
JUSTINIAN 2.1.1 (Moyle trans. 5th ed. 1912).
29. See, e.g., Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrinefrom Its HistoricalShackles, supra note
5, at 185; Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law, supra note 14, at 17-4.

30. For discussions of the American history of the doctrine, see Stevens, supra note 3
and Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law, supra note 5, at 475-91.

31. Sax,Judicial Intervention, supra note 5, at 477.
32. For example, consider the reliance upon constitutional protections of individual
liberty, or an effort to give constitutional definition to the police power concept. Neither
approach is likely to be appealing to most public trust advocates because both could serve
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were to have a different purpose; the protection not of private rights,
33
but of the public interest.
What is the public interest? Sax does not offer many thoughts on
that question. I suppose that he, like so many others, assumes that the
answer is obvious - the very purpose of a government's existence is to
serve the public interest. Political scientists, whose business it is to define concepts like "public interest," usually tell us that "public interest"
is what the public authorities, properly constituted, say it is. 3 4 In our
society, the proper constitution of public authority is democracy, but
Professor Sax suggests that the courts should employ the public trust
doctrine to limit the democratic legislature in the name of the public
interest. 3 5 Everyone knows that the legislature is a far more democratic
institution than the judiciary. Therefore, it seems that Sax may have
gotten it backwards. How can the counter-majoritarian courts protect
the public interest from the democratic legislature?
Although Sax admits that "there is no well-conceived doctrinal basis that supports a theory under which some interests are entitled to
special judicial attention and protection," ' 3 6 he argues that some important ideas converge in the public trust doctrine. First is the idea that
certain interests are intrinsically important to a frce society. 37 Surely no
one will dispute this idea. Consider the interest of the individual to be
free from abuse of criminal process or to express one's political views?
But these types of interests are not quite what Professor Sax has in
mind. Instead, he is thinking more about those interests which have
38
I
been at the heart of every call for freedom: fishing and navigation.
to
the
navigation
fishing
and
of
do not mean to belittle the importance
the interests of either side in resource allocation disputes. The one-sided nature of the
public trust approach is discussed infra at notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
33. Professor Sax begins his 1970 article with the statement that: "[plublic concern
about environmental quality is beginning to be felt in the courtroom." Sax,Judicial Intervention, supra note 4, at 473. His very next sentence states that "[p]rivate citizens, no
longer willing to accede to the efforts of administrative agencies to protect the public interest, have begun to take the initiative themselves." Id. at 473. Professor Sax would
surely be among the first to challenge the invisible-hand arguments of the free enterprise
advocates, yet his evidence of detriment to the public interest is private unrest. The only
difference would seem to be that free enterprise proponents admit to being motivated by
self-interest, while Sax's private citizens claim to be motivated by the public interest.
34.

See, e.g., THE PUBLIC INTEREST (C. Friedrich ed. 1962).

35. Professor Sax states that some democratic decisions will be "ultimately found to
be unjustifiable." Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 5, at 491. Later in the article, he
explains that the democratic failures addressed by the public trust doctrine are different
from the failures which result from the influence of a tyrannical majority. The latter requires judicial intervention in the name of individual rights. The democratic failures requiring public trust intervention result when "a diffuse majority is made subject to the will
of a concerted minority." Id. at 560. Professor Sax would have the courts remand "appropriate cases to the legislature after public opinion has been aroused." Id. See infra text
accompanying notes 47-61. Professor Sax does, however, state that the courts will "probably not impose public trust constraints on explicit legislative acts," id. at 542, but then
identifies two exceptions where such judicial intervention in the legislative process will be
appropriate. Id. at 542-43. See infra text accompanying notes 60-61.
36. SaxJudicialIntervention, supra note 5.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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enterprise and commerce of eighteenth and nineteenth century American society, but in 1970, neither fishing nor navigation on internal waters were essential to a free American society. The once mighty
Columbia River had been reduced by dams to a long string of ponds
with a sadly depleted fishery, 3 9 but freedom was doing about as well in
the Pacific Northwest as anyplace else in the world. What is important
to the concept of freedom is not fishing and navigation in-and-of themselves, but rather what they have symbolized in American history: free
enterprise, commerce, and the right of every individual to share in the
exploitation of nature's bounty.
This concern for nature's bounty, although stated somewhat differently by Sax, is the second idea which Sax argues intersects the public
trust doctrine. He believes that that there are some interests that "are
so particularly the gifts of nature's bounty that they ought to be reserved
for the whole of the populace."' 40 Sax analogizes the legislative protection of the "great ponds" of early New England to the twentieth century
protection of national parks. 4 1 However, there is a fundamental difference between early New England and our modern society that the intervening centuries have obscured. Seventeenth-century New Englanders
were not protecting their great ponds from destruction by communal
exploitation, which is the central purpose of today's national parks,
rather they were asserting the right of everyone to exploit nature's
bounty against a King who had sought to keep all the natural resources
of the early colonies for the Crown. 4 2 Thus, Sax has unwittingly relied
upon the right of all individuals to exploit natural resources as a foundation for the public trust doctrine.
Finally, Sax grounds his public trust doctrine on the recognition
"that certain uses have a peculiarly public nature that makes their adaptation to private use inappropriate. ' 43 His example is the usufructuary
nature of private interests in water. He argues that riparian and appropriation water law recognize only usufructuary rights because of the perceived importance of protecting the public interest in the water
resource. 44 This, however, is simply not true. The usufructuary nature
of water rights is a product of the migratory nature of the water resource. Recognition of title in the water itself is not practical in light of
its evanescent character. The fact that a water right is a usufruct makes
it no less enforceable against private or public interference than are
rights in land. Indeed, state interference with private use of land has far
outstripped state regulation of private water use over the last half century, notwithstanding that water rights are usufructs. Anyone who says,
as Sax did in 1970, that "[i]t is . . .thought to be incumbent upon the
39.

See Blumm, The Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage: Prologue to the Pacific Northwest Elec-

tric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 58 WASH. L. REV. 175 (1982).
40. Sax,Judicial Intervention, supra note 5, at 484.
41.

Id. at 484-85.

42. See also Sax, Decline of Private Property, supra note 5.
43. Sax,Judicial Intervention, supra note 5, at 485.
44.

Id.
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government to regulate water uses for the general benefit of the community .... -45 either knows little about American water law to that
date, or is trying to mislead4 6 us. It is clear that Professor Sax knows a
good deal about water law.
Despite the weakness of Sax's purported foundation for the public
trust doctrine, the doctrine is flourishing, 4 7 often with reliance on the
Sax argument. But Sax does not rely exclusively on history. His central
thesis is that democracy sometimes does not work; that some democratic
decisions are "ultimately found to be unjustifiable." '4 8 Sax urges that
this finding is to be made by the courts because "it will often be the case
that the whole of the public interest has not been adequately considered
by the legislative or administrative officials." 4 9 Among the reasons that
Sax cites for democratic failures are "limited visibility" policy decisions, 50 "inequality of access to, and influence over, administrative
agencies" 5 1 and localism. 52 According to Sax, "[t]he public trust concept is not so much a substantive set of standards ... as it is a technique
by which courts may mend perceived imperfections in the legislative and
administrative process." 5 3 Sax goes on to state that the doctrine is "a
medium for democratization. ' '54 It is an idea that John Hart Ely would
later apply to a broad interpretation ofjiudicial review under the Constitution, 5 5 and one which neither Sax nor Hart have adequately justified. 56 Unanswered is the question of why the judiciary, an elitist
institution with few democratic credentials, should be in a position to
second-guess the actions of a legislature and its administrators.
In his environmental law handbook, Professor Rodgers describes
the public trust doctrine as the state's version of the federal courts'
45. Id.
46. SeeJ. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING & POLICY (1968).

47. W. RODGERS, supra note 17. Professor Rodgers cites California, New Jersey, Illinois, and Wisconsin as states where the doctrine has received recent consideration. Other
states adopting the public trust doctrine are: Florida [Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc.,
369 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981)]; Louisiana [Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So. 2d
576 (La. 1975)]; Massachusetts [Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378
Mass. 629, 393 N.E.2d 356 (1979)]; North Dakota [United Plainsmen Assocs. v. North
Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976)] and Oregon
[Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 285 Or. 197, 590 P.2d 709 (1979)].
48. Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 5, at 484.
49. Id. at 495.
50. Id.

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 498.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 509.
Id.

55. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). Professor Hart's concern is about a dif-

ferent type of democratic failure. The focus of his concern is the problem of the "discrete
and insular minority" rather than the silent majority that Sax wishes to protect. See supra
note 35.
56. The inadequacy which Professors Sax and Hart share is in failing to explain why
democracy is or ought to be a fundamental value of the American political process. If we
accept that it is,Professor Hart's argument is more persuasive than Professor Sax's because the "discrete and insular minority" has in a real sense been excluded, while the
silent majority has simply failed to get involved.

COMMENT ON PUBLIC TRUST WRITINGS

1986]

"hard look" doctrine. 5 7 Sax apparently agrees with this characterization, having noted that "[ilt is no more - and no less - than a name
courts give to their concerns about the insufficiencies of the democratic
process." 5 8 Thus perceived, the justification of the public trust doctrine
is merely part of the general effort to justify an activist and interventionist judiciary. 59 Defenders of the "hard look" doctrine are at pains to
explain that it is purely a form of procedural intervention 60 and maintain, as Sax does with the public trust doctrine, that it "has no life of its
own and no intrinsic content."' 6 1 Nevertheless, courts must have standards which tell them when there has been a short in the democratic
circuits. Do the courts really look at the process, assuming they will
know a democratic failure when they see one, or do they look at the
substantive product of the suspect democratic action? It might be argued that the answer to this question does not really matter if the available remedies are purely procedural. However, it would be naive to
suggest that procedural remedies do not have substantive consequences. The history of environmental litigation over the last two decades is one of procedural remedies being employed for well-defined
62
substantive purposes.
Sax suggests that the courts are hesitant to overturn explicit legislative action "even if [the] authorization seems to go to the outer edge of
legitimacy." '63 Presumably this "outer edge of legitimacy" is where the
democratic process is being abused. According to Sax, the hesitant
courts will recognize this realm of legislative abuse by "blatant evidence
of corruption"64 or by the need for specific legislative authorization by a
broadly representative agency. 6 5 The courts will know as much about
corruption as any other public institution, so perhaps they can effectively intervene when votes have been sold or officials have been bribed.
But they surely need nothing so obscure as the public trust doctrine to
justify intervention in such cases. So, it is really Sax's second character57.

W.

58.

Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 5, at 521.

RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw §

2.16 (1977).

59. Proponents of the public trust and the "hard look" approaches will deny that judicial application of these doctrines constitutes either activism or interventionism. Yet, however labeled, these doctrines undeniably involve the judiciary in decisions that would
otherwise be the exclusive domain of the legislative and administrative branches of
government.

60. Some are at greater pains than others. Judge Wright of the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals argues for a substantive review of agency actions. Wright, The
Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judical Review. 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375

(1984). Judge Bazelon of the same court argues for a purely procedural review. Bazelon,
Science and Uncertainty: A jurist's
View, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 209 (1981).

61. Sax,Judicial Intervention, supra note 5, at 521.
62. One example of a procedural remedy being employed for substantive purposes is
the litigation occurring under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42
U.S.C. § 4321 et. seq. (1970). For discussions of the substantive aspects of this act, see
Comment, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969: Toward a Substantive Standardof Review, 4 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 163 (1974) and Note, Substantive Review under the

National Environmental Policy Act: EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 3 EcOLOGY L.Q. 173 (1973).
63. Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 5, at 542.
64. Id. at 542-43.
65.

Id. at 543.
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istic of legislative abuse which will identify cases requiring public trust
intervention. Thus, Sax is really concerned about those cases where not
everyone had a fair opportunity at influencing a decision, not because
someone illegally precluded their input, but because of inadequacies inherent in the representative democratic process. Sax's concern for democratic failures is legitimate. In a complex society where government is
called upon to do many things, the opportunities for democratic breakdown are numerous. Because every special interest will recognize the
possibilities for gaining particular advantage, Professor Sax would have
the courts ever on the lookout for decisions that are the consequence of
legal, but unfair influence.
There is an intriguing parallel between this justification of the public trust doctrine, which according to Sax provides "considerable opportunity for fruitful judicial intervention, ' '6 6 and the standard justification
for government intervention in the market allocation of resources. Market system failures are said to justify government regulation or ownership of resources. By entrusting a democratically constituted government with the power to allocate resources, society guards against the
ancient abuses wrought by kings and emperors. Thus, we substitute
fairness for efficiency as our resource allocation goal, while guarding
against power-hungry political bosses picking up where the robber barons left off. Sax argues that democratic failures require intervention,
and that no one but the courts are left to do it. Thus, governmental
intervention to correct for market failures is paralleled by Sax's insistence that courts must intervene to correct for legislative and administrative failures. Sax, however, neglects to address the questions of who
will intervene to correct for judicial failures, and more importantly,
whether the situation has been improved or worsened by judicial interventions in private decision making.
Sax insists that the courts are quite competent in intervening in the
allocation of natural resources, noting that the California and Wisconsin
courts have "fruitfully engaged" in the process of discriminating be67
tween appropriate and inappropriate dealings with public trust lands.
But whether or not a particular use of public trust lands is appropriate
depends on the standards of propriety applied. Assume for a moment
that Professor Sax is Judge Sax sitting with Judge Posner on the federal
bench. Will Sax and Posner agree that the Wisconsin and California
decisions are "fruitful?" They might agree that a particular decision was
"fruitful," but for very different reasons. Judge Posner does not mind a
68
little judicial activism in the name of efficient resource allocation.
Sometimes Posner's standard of propriety (efficiency) will coincide with
Sax's idea of the appropriate use of public trust lands, but often it will
not. Posner will be able to explain his conclusion in the relatively pre66. Id. at 544.
67. Id. at 552.
68. "Since any ruling of law will constitute a precedent, the judge must consider the
probable impact of alternative rulings .
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 19
(2d ed. 1977).
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cise concepts of resource economics. A debate with him would focus on
his interpretation and application of economic principles and the propriety of the value of efficiency as a goal in resource allocation.
A debate with Judge Sax would be less fruitful. This is because it is
almost impossible to predict what result the democratic process, when
functioning properly, will produce; therefore, it is extremely difficult to
discern whether or not there has been a democratic failure leading to an
inappropriate use of public trust lands. The democratic failures which
concern Sax are not those which result from blatant racial discrimination
or rural dominance in malapportioned state legislatures. 69 The equal
protection clause is adequate to correct for such failures. Sax is concerned about the subtle democratic failures inherent in the dayto-day lobbying, negotiating, vote-swapping, log-rolling, back-slapping,
and even back-stabbing that are the staples of the legislative process.
Unfortunately, Sax neglects to tell us how to identify this sort of democratic failure, nor does he even suggest that we will know it when we see
it. What we will know, including those of us who are judges, is whether
or not we like the resource allocation decision which has been made.
Sax likes the results of the public trust decisions of the Wisconsin
and California courts. I also like those results, but cannot defend the
means employed to accomplish them. Sax has failed to provide an adequate justification. His democracy argument is a smoke screen for a
doctrine that permits some losers in the political arena to have a second
chance in the courts. 70 I say some political losers because it is, in effect,
a biased doctrine which serves the personal values of Joe Sax and Jim
Huffman, but not of everyone, or even necessarily a majority, in American society. Not only do judges determine the standard of propriety,
but they establish many of the rules for access to judicial review. Thus,
even when judges are elected, the courts by nature of their function are
not democratic institutions. Not everyone is in a position to bring their
concerns before a policy-making court.
Ten years after his 1970 article, Sax wrote a short piece for a symposium on the public trust doctrine. 7 1 In that article he introduced an
additional argument for the public trust doctrine. Sax argued that
"It]he central idea of the public trust is preventing the destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in common, but without formal recognition such as title."' 72 In support of this argument, Sax employed the
familiar example of the commons. Although Sax acknowledged the inefficiencies of the commons described by Hardin 73 and many others, he
focused on the expectations developed by the common folk in the use of
69. See, e.g., Reynolds v.Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Brown v.Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954). These are the types of democratic failure that concerned Professor Hart
in his book, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). See supra notes 35 and 53.
70. I have developed this theme in more detail in a review ofR. APPLEGATE, Supra note
2. Huffman, Public Trusts: Gaining Access to the Courts, 8 ENVTL. L. 217, 230-31 (1977).

71. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 5.
72. Id. at 188.
73. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
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the commons, which were subsequently disappointed by the assertions of power by knights, lords, and other members of the exploitative
class. 7 4 For Sax, the commons was a battleground of class struggle and
feudal exploitation, not a place of inefficient resource allocation. According to Sax, the disappointment of the expectations of the common
folk led to agrarian revolts. 75 Sax implies that if there had been a public
trust doctrine at the time, the courts could have told the knights and
lords to let the peasants continue to farm. 7 6 Although such a result
would undoubtably have satisfied Sax, Judge Posner would probably not
be impressed with the solution.
Without a doubt this latest pronouncement by Sax on the public
trust doctrine offers an activist court additional ammunition to justify its
intervention. Yet, from a theoretical point of view, there seems to be
little connection between the democracy justification and the stability
justification. Indeed, a properly functioning democracy is capable of upsetting popular expectations and thereby destabilizing society. Thus, it
appears that Sax would have the courts intervene even in those instances
where the democratic process has worked properly, but expectations
have been upset. One wonders ifjudicial action will also be appropriate
where expectations are being protected by a malfunctioning democracy.
A democracy is capable of confirming, as public rights, popular expectations which have the purpose and effect of disadvantaging particular segments of society. Many democratically confirmed expectations
were upset by the civil rights laws of the 1950's and 1960's, but all recognize that those expectations did not merit protection. How about the
expectations of those who have fished, hiked, and driven on the public
lands for decades and are now precluded in the interest of resource protection? Professor Sax will have no difficulty in refusing to protect those
expectations, but others will disagree. There are expectations and there
are expectations. There is stability and there is stability.
In a 1984 article for the University of Pittsburgh Law Review, Sax
refers to a picturesque village, in rural Arkansas, Boxley Valley, to illus77
trate his argument for protecting the expectations of a community.
Perhaps Boxley Valley will make a fine museum, but should we preserve
its quaint "vernacular country architecture" 7 8 and agricultural lifestyle
in the name of community stability. Every rural community, including
those less quaint than Boxley Valley, is interested in stability. A community identical in appearance to a hundred other communities is no less a
community. Change, while often uncomfortable, is inevitable. Sax does
74. Professor Sax attributes the shift from the "agrarian economy of the forest, with
its common uses and customary rights," to the pressures for privatization, class separation, and resource exploitation. Sax, Liberatingthe Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 5, at 19091.
75. Id. at 189-90.

76. Id.
77. Sax, Do Communities lave Rights? The National Parks as a Laboratory of New Ideas, 45
U. Prrr. L. REV. 499, 507 (1984).

78. Id.
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not claim that the public trust doctrine can or should be employed to
preserve the unique community of Boxley Valley, but that conclusion
flows from his earlier arguments for democracy and the protection of
expectations. A doctrine that serves "to prevent the destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in common" 79 for the use of beaches
and navigable waters, certainly would serve to prevent disappointment
for those who treasure the quaintness of Boxley Valley.
What really concerns Professor Sax is the question of local autonomy in a highly integrated national political and economic system. It is
an important issue that is better addressed on its merits than obscured
by the mysteries of public trust doctrine or other forms ofjudicial intervention. Although the public trust doctrine may serve the nostalgic interests of those who choose to live where community is of little
importance, it is unlikely, indeed impractical, that it will serve the interests of those whose lives and expectations are strongly tied to a particular community. Those people, absent the assistance of benevolent
outsiders, can preserve their community through the political and economic processes.
II.

THE PUBLIC TRUST JURISPRUDENCE OF PROFESSOR WILKINSON

Professor Wilkinson is concerned with the application of the public
trust doctrine to the management of the federal public lands, which he
notes "are at the outer reaches of the public trust doctrine."8 0 Wilkinson describes a parallel between the public trust doctrine and public
land law. He identifies three historical eras in public land law, the most
recent of which dates from 1970.81 Since that date, with the adoption of
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 8 2 and other legislation,
public land law has become a source of public rights. 8 3 The government
has moved from the role of proprietor to the role of sovereign in relation to the public lands. As a sovereign, the government is limited by
the rights of the public, both through public trust and public land law. 84
Wilkinson's argument depends upon the acceptance of the notion
79. Id.
80. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, supra note 6, at 273.
81. During the first era (up to 1888), the federal government had an obligation to the
states to dispose of public lands and make new states. During the second era (1888-1970),
the public lands were a source of federal power to manage natural resources. The third
era (since 1970) is one of public rights derived from public ownership of land. Id. at 278,

280, 284.
82. Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743
(1976).
83. The third era "involves the direct or indirect use of the public trust doctrine to
limit federal power and to justify rights of the public against the federal government."
Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, supra note 6, at 284.
84. "[t]he shift to a conceptualization of the federal role as governmental rather
than proprietary focuses attention on duties to the public. Rulemaking is required, records are open, decision-making is shared, and the courts are available
because public lands business is public business. It is the public to whom public
lands managers are ultimately accountable."
Id. at 304. A parallel effect of this change in conceptualization of the federal role is that
private parties harmed by federal actions are less likely to recover compensation. The
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of public rights as meaningful. His point is not that individuals have
rights rooted in the public trust doctrine, although at least some individuals must have standing to act on behalf of the public. Instead, his point
is that the public, as an entity, has rights. I am skeptical about the concept of public rights, which, like the concept of the public interest, will
forever elude a definition that is acceptable to all individuals and groups
in society. I am even more skeptical about our ability to agree upon
what a public right is, assuming that such things can be said to exist in
any meaningful sense. The problem of defining public rights is similar
to the problem Christopher Stone faced in defining the rights of inanimate objects. 8 5 Indeed, Wilkinson links these two concepts in asserting
'86
that "the [public trust] doctrine protects the resources themselves."
The difficulty with Stone's idea was that individual people had to act on
behalf of the inanimate objects, thus requiring reliance upon some individual's perception of the interests of the inanimate object. The same
problem exists for actions on behalf of the public trust.
In the Mono Lake case, 8 7 for example, it was not an officially designated representative of the public who brought the action, but rather a
self-appointed representative who was suing the official representatives. 8 8 Wilkinson claims that the doctrine will not permit judges to be
"roving ambassadors" 89 on behalf of environmentalists, that it is a
"value-neutral" approach. 90 But I do not think Professor Wilkinson really believes that the Mountain States Legal Foundation, for example,
could successfully rely on the public trust doctrine to get an injunction
against the National Park Service requiring the extermination of Yellowstone's grizzly bears because they threaten public enjoyment of the park.
On the other hand, it is quite conceivable that an injunction might issue
pursuant to the trust doctrine or public land laws requiring the exclusion of humans from some areas to protect the grizzlies' use of the park.
It is not a value-neutral doctrine. It is a doctrine which serves the interests of groups with particular conceptions of the public interest. I am
for the bears, but many of my fellow citizens can do without them.
Unlike Sax, who seeks to obscure the counter-majoritarian diffidistinction is one which runs from government tort liability through takings law, to public
resource management, although not necessarily consistently.

85. Stone constructed a persuasive case for the idea of natural objects having rights,
but failed to explain how those rights would be defined and asserted except by self-interested individuals purporting to act on behalf of the natural object. C. STONE, SHOULD
TREES HAVE STANDING (1974). See Huffman, Trees as a Minority, 5 ENVTL. L. 199 (1974).
86. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, supra note 6, at 315.
87. National Audubon Soc y, supra note 12.
88. Defendant Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles is the administrative body responsible for implementing the public interest as determined by the
Los Angeles City government. The Department's water rights were granted pursuant to
legislation administered by the California Water Board and enacted by the California Legislature. The plaintiff National Audubon Society has no similar claim to being a democratically certified representative of the public interest or protector of the public rights.
89. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, supra note 6, at 315.
90. Id. at 316.
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culty, Wilkinson is quite up front in his preference for judicial intervention. Wilkinson argues that the doctrine is rooted
in the precept that some resources are so central to the wellbeing of the community that they must be protected by distinctive, judge-made principles. This is an accepted process in our
law: Anglo-American jurisprudence is rife with judicially developed doctrines
that reflect the deeply held convictions of our
9
society. 1
This argument, however, undercuts Wilkinson's assertion that the doctrine is value-neutral for it is difficult to comprehend how deeply held
convictions can be value-neutral. Moreover, the assertion that the judiciary is the source of most judicially enforced American convictions is
debatable. Most "American convictions" of legal significance trace directly to or are expressed in the Constitution. Few would assert that the
public trust doctrine has constitutional roots. Indeed, the doctrine functions to limit the constitutional role of the legislative and executive
branches of government.
III.

THE PUBLIC TRUST JURISPRUDENCE OF PROFESSOR DUNNING

Professor Dunning has authored two articles on the public trust
doctrine, one in anticipation of the Mono Lake decision 92 and the other
as a follow-up to that case. 9 3 In the first article, Dunning lays out the
California law of public trust easement in a straightforward and understandable manner. 9 4 He addresses the counter-majoritarian difficulty,
arguing that democracy is protected by the fact that public trust uses
may be eliminated if the change is consistent with public trust purposes. 9 5 However, the determination of public trust purposes remains
with the courts, and the legislature will take its chances in altering public
trust uses. It is also difficult to agree with his argument that the public
trust easement is the only way of providing public benefits because, as
he admits, California law provides "[n]o water right may exist simply for
the benefit of the public in general." 9 6 There are significant public benefits, in the sense of benefit to persons other than the rights holder, that
are derived from private rights in water. If California water law prohibits the creation of private rights which deliver only public benefits, the
public trust easement is not the only way, nor the best way, to resolve
that problem. If public sentiment strongly favors providing these public
benefits, then the California legislature could surely be persuaded to
amend this restrictive law.
Dunning argues that "it should not follow that, merely because the
91. Id. at 315.
92. Dunning, The Significance of California's Public Trust Easement for California Water
Rights Law, supra note 8.
93. Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western 4ater Law: Discordor Harmony?, supra
note 8.
94. Dunning, The Significance of California's Public Trust Easement for California Water
Rights Law, supra note 8, at 363-78.
95. Id. at 370.
96. Id. at 383.
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physical capacity exists and water rights are recognized, a court must
permit a project operator to divert water from the basin to the full extent of the water rights."' 97 However, unless a water right is something
other than a right to divert water, it does follow that such diversion must
be permitted. Under Dunning's interpretation, a water right is a right to
divert water except when a court or some other authority disagrees.
That is not a very meaningful right. It is true that California water users
have had to deal with uncertainties and that, as Dunning has noted, "the
need for adaptation is nothing new to California's water rights system," 9 8 but Californians pay a price for that uncertainty. At present,
California has a private rights system for water allocation. That system,
like any social institution as Sax notes, 99 will benefit from stability. The
Mono Lake decision has introduced significant uncertainties into California water use allocation.
In his article for the 1984 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute,
Dunning discussed the Mono Lake decision and recent developments in
other jurisdictions. To assuage the fears of developers, he states that
"there is no reason to believe [that the public trust doctrine] has greatly
modified the course of ... development [along the water's edge]."' 0 0
This assurance seems a little disingenuous if the doctrine is really perceived as a means for protecting public uses against the ravages of private development. In fact, Dunning admits, unlike Wilkinson, that the
doctrine "serves as an instrument to strengthen the hand of those concerned about maintaining coastal access and preserving some of our
rapidly disappearing wetlands."''1 1 He does not suggest, however, that
it strengthens the hand of real estate developers.
Unlike Sax, who claims that the doctrine is only a means of referring
decisions back to the legislature, Dunning recognizes that "[a]ll existing
water rights which adversely impact public trust values are now subject
to reconsideration and modification by either an agency or a court in the
name of the public trust."' 1 2 Thus, the courts will have to decide the
substantive questions of the extent of land subject to the trust and the
uses protected by the trust. Dunning admits that different judges, Mosk
and Rehnquist in his example, 10 3 will come to different conclusions.
This diversity ofjudicial opinion is not the preservation of democracy in
action, as Sax argues. Rather it is judicial law-making in the name of the
public interest. Although we may agree with a particular judge's determination of the public interest, the judiciary as an institution is not competent to make such determinations.
To his credit, Dunning's analysis of the public trust doctrine as a
97. Id. at 396.
98. Id. at 397.
99. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
100.

note 8,
101.
102.
103.

Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law: Discord or Harmony?, supra

at 17-39.
Id. at 17-40.
Id. at 17-42.
Id. at 17-23 to 17-24.

1986]

COMMENT ON PUBLIC TRUST WRITINGS

close relative of the reserved rights doctrine and of the reasonableness
principle of California water law is logically sound. 10 4 All three doctrines are means of judicial intervention in public policy making, along
with several other doctrines mentioned by Professor Johnson, whose
writings are the final subject of my critique.
IV.

THE PUBLIC TRUST JURISPRUDENCE OF PROFESSOR JOHNSON

Johnson adds to the list of water law doctrines supporting judicial
intervention an expanding navigation servitude, the federal doctrine of
equitable apportionment, public water rights, and regulation pursuant
to the police power. 10 5 According to Johnson, all of these evidence the
rejection of eminent domain as "too costly, too cumbersome, too timeconsuming, and not required by the equities of the water rights holders."1 06 AlthoughJohnson does not seek to justify this rejection of eminent domain as a tool for implementing public water policy, his
approach is extremely attractive to those who would otherwise have to
pay, be inconvenienced, or await the implementation of eminent domain
proceedings. There may be no such thing as a free lunch, but there are
many ways of redistributing the costs of lunch. The public trust doctrine
is one such mechanism, which avoids having to persuade a legislative
body of the wisdom of the wealth transfer.
Of course, the beneficiaries of the public trust will argue that there
is no wealth transfer because the public rights under the doctrine predate any private rights.' 0 7 The same argument is made in support of the
reserved rights doctrine.' 0 8 It is the most attractive aspect of both doctrines, but it is pure mythology. 10 9 By any standard of reasonable legal
expectation, the City of Los Angeles had no reason to doubt its water
rights in the Mono Basin. "l0
Johnson seeks to define a "broader, functionally oriented public
104. Id. at 17-42 to 17-44.
105. Johnson, Public Trust Protectionfor Stream Flows and Lake Levels, supra note 7, at 23436.
106. Id. at 236.
107. The Illinois Central court quoted Chief Justice Taney to date the trust right from
the Revolution when "the people of each State became themselves sovereign, and in that
character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soils under them,
for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the general government." Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 456, (quoting Martin v.
Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842)).
108. The reserved rights doctrine assigns a date to Indian and federal water rights
which results in subsequently acquired water rights being junior and therefore less secure.
This is the rule notwithstanding that none of the reservations in question expressly reserve
water rights. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 595-60 (1963); Winters v.
United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
109. TRELEASE, .4 Fable, in WATER LAw: RESOURCE USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 815 (2d ed. 1974).
110. The City made legal purchases of riparian rights on streams tributary to Mono
Lake between 1920 and 1934. In 1934, the City acquired by eminent domain riparian
rights pertaining to Mono Lake. City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 10 Cal. App. 2d 460, 52
P.2d 585 (1935). In 1940, the California Water Board granted the City permits to appropriate the waters of four Mono Lake tributaries. The City undertook massive water transport projects to supply this water to its residents. Thirty-nine years after the state permit
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trust doctrine" by categorizing traditional public trust cases.' I l He
brings in many cases that are not by name public trust cases and asserts
that in fact they should be so classified." 2 Although I would prefer a
system of legal analysis in which such exercises in classification would be
irrelevant, I recognize that Johnson's objective is to expand the reach of
the doctrine by expanding the historical content upon which future decisions will rely.
Johnson insists that judicial failure to limit water extractions on the
public trust theory would allow the destruction of public rights "with
impunity by persons claiming water rights under the prior appropriation
...system of water law." ' 13 He goes so far as to suggest that express
legislative approval of extraction should be required in some situations, 114 a proposal that makes a mockery of a water rights system,
which in most western states requires the diversion of water for the assertion and maintenance of private rights. According to Johnson, the
115
question is not whether, but how to protect instream water uses.
There has been an increased demand for instream water use over the
past two decades, but the "whether" question will always remain as values and supply and demand change. Certainly, the "how" question is
important, but Johnson and almost everyone else concerned with this
issue have mistakenly presumed that certain resource allocations are inherently preferable and that such allocations will only be achieved
through public action. 1 6 Johnson's argument is based on the premise
that if the legislature fails to act, the courts must act pursuant to the
public trust doctrine.
V.

CONCLUSION

This discussion of the works of four distinguished scholars leads to
a few broad conclusions about the public trust doctrine. First, the doctrine is clearly part of a trend which Sax argues has resulted in "property
rights . . .being fundamentally redefined to the disadvantage of prop-

erty owners." 1 17 1 think this trend is an unfortunate one in terms of the
management and allocation of increasingly scarce natural resources.
Garrett Hardin and other writers have reminded us of the tragedy of the
commons.' 18 The solution to the commons tragedy is not a management committee or dictator, it is private property.' 19 The trend reprewas granted and 45 to 59 years after the riparian rights were acquired, the City's rights
were challenged under the public trust theory.
111. Johnson, Public Trust Protectionfor Stream Flows and Lake Levels, supra note 7, at 241.
112. Id. at 244-55. See supra 83 and accompanying text.
113. Johnson, Public Trust Protectionfor Stream Flow and Lake Levels, supra note 7, at 257.
114. Id. at 258.
115. Id. at 265.
116. For a contrary view, see HUFFMAN, Instream Water Use.- Public and Private Alternatives,
in WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
249 (1983).
117. Sax, Decline of Private Property, supra note 5, at 481.
118. See supra note 73.
119. See G. HARDIN &J. BADEN, MANAGING THE COMMONS (1977). In his original article,
Professor Hardin noted that our solution to the tragedy of the commons is private prop-
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sented by the public trust doctrine is simply a return to the commons.
The only difference is that the commons is totally closed to some interests, while the permitted development interests must jump through an
assortment of legislative, administrative, and judicial hoops. Having to
jump through hoops may slow the process of exploitation, thereby postponing the tragedy, but the combination of increasing demand and
diminishing supply will assure that the resources are exhausted, particularly where the effect of governmental action is to redistribute wealth.
Therefore, society should give some consideration to private alternatives to the commons.
Second, assuming that Sax's democracy theory is the central justification for the doctrine, that it is just another form of the hard look doctrine as Rodgers suggests, I am at a loss for why we should be enamored
with the democratic allocation of resources. I do not doubt that democracy is the best form of government, but I do not think that leads to the
conclusion that the best way to make any or every resource allocation
decision is democratically. To the contrary, the fact that the best form
of government is democracy argues for making as few decisions as possible through government. The democratic process, when employed to
allocate resources, is simply a more or less civilized scramble for the
distributional benefits of particular allocations of resources. Because
ours is often a less than civilized society, many members of which value
the roar of motorized transport over the calm of a mountain wilderness
and the comforts of a high-energy life style over the fish runs of the
Columbia River, the public trust doctrine permits the more civilized
members of our society to appeal to the courts to force the democracy to
reconsider its decisions and come to a wiser choice.
Surely we are not deceived by this bit of legal fast shoe. If we believe in democracy, we should certainly live with its consequences. The
public trust doctrine and its relations are tools for political losers or for
those seeking to avoid the costs of becoming political winners. It forces
the proponents of legislative action to justify a particular decision in isolation from the give-and-take of the legislative process. It is frequently
argued that if the legislature does not like what the courts do, they can
change it. Legislative action, however, does not come easily in the modern state legislature. Controversial issues, even where there is a clear
majority position, are easily overlooked in the interests of other legislative agendas. Some will assert that a legislature's failure to act is an act
in and of itself. However, the logic of that proposition is lost in the
legislative context where the potential agenda always consists of more
issues than can be considered meaningfully.
Third, the contention that the public trust doctrine is just another
form of the "hard look" doctrine should not persuade us to be comfortable with the public trust approach. Instead, it should lead us to be
erty which, when combined with inheritance laws, "is unjust - but we put up with it because we are not convinced, at the moment, that anyone has invented a better system."
Hardin, supra note 73, at 1251.
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skeptical of the "hard look" doctrine. Rodgers is right in linking the two
because both are concepts used to justify judicial intervention in legislative and executive actions. The "hard look" doctrine tries hard to appear purely procedural and outcome neutral, but the public trust
version of that doctrine reveals its substance. How hard a court looks
does not depend exclusively upon the adequacy of the legislative and
executive procedure, it also depends upon the substantive action that
was taken. If we have learned nothing else from the legal realists, we
should have come to understand the impact of values on judicial
decisions.
Although, I do not wish to defend democracy as a resource allocator, neither do I wish to defend the resources allocation efforts of legislators and administrators. Thus, the real issue in all of this is what
institutional mechanisms should we employ to allocate resources. The
public trust doctrine is part of a widespread presumption in favor of
public allocation, 12 0 although it is really a remedy for the perceived failure of public allocation. Thus, it parallels our approach to environmental law, which has been to regulate the regulators with at least as much
vigor as they regulate private actions. If public resource allocations are
perceived to be a problem, we should look at the possibility of improving the private rights system before resorting to reliance on an arcane
doctrine that probably never meant what its proponents claim it means
and that ignores the fact that the foundation of our resource allocation
system is private property rights. Thus, state courts should take a "hard
look" at the shortcomings of public trust theory before jumping into
Mono Lake with the California Supreme Court.

120. Professor Sax's article in the Washington Law Review is an excellent statement of
this presumption. See Sax, Decline of Private Proper(y, supra note 5.

